About: Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) Pandemic – The Risk of Aerosol Generation during Medical Procedures

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About: Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) Pandemic – The Risk of Aerosol Generation during Medical Procedures Goto Sponge NotDistinct Permalink

An Entity of Type : schema:ScholarlyArticle, within Data Space : covidontheweb.inria.fr associated with source document(s)

Attributes	Values
type	Academic Article research paper schema:ScholarlyArticle
isDefinedBy	Covid-on-the-Web dataset
has title	Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) Pandemic – The Risk of Aerosol Generation during Medical Procedures
Creator	Nguyen-Van-Tam, Jonathan Thomson, Gail Bentley, Andrew Dove, Brian Hoffman, Peter Isalska, Barbara Macken, Susan Mittal, Himanshu Parks, Simon Thompson, Katy-Anne Bennett, Allan Copley, Vicky O'brien, Sarah Pappachan, John
Source	Medline; PMC
abstract	BACKGROUND: Nosocomial infection of health-care workers (HCWs) during outbreaks of respiratory infections (e.g. Influenza A H1N1 (2009)) is a significant concern for public health policy makers. World Health Organization (WHO)-defined ‘aerosol generating procedures’ (AGPs) are thought to increase the risk of aerosol transmission to HCWs, but there are presently insufficient data to quantify risk accurately or establish a hierarchy of risk-prone procedures. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: This study measured the amount of H1N1 (2009) RNA in aerosols in the vicinity of H1N1 positive patients undergoing AGPs to help quantify the potential risk of transmission to HCWs. There were 99 sampling occasions (windows) producing a total of 198 May stages for analysis in the size ranges 0.86–7.3 µm. Considering stages 2 (4–7.3 µm) and 3 (0.86–4 µm) as comprising one sample, viral RNA was detected in 14 (14.1%) air samples from 10 (25.6%) patients. Twenty three air samples were collected while potential AGPs were being performed of which 6 (26.1%) contained viral RNA; in contrast, 76 May samples were collected when no WHO 2009 defined AGP was being performed of which 8 (10.5%) contained viral RNA (unadjusted OR = 2.84 (95% CI 1.11–7.24) adjusted OR = 4.31 (0.83–22.5)). CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: With our small sample size we found that AGPs do not significantly increase the probability of sampling an H1N1 (2009) positive aerosol (OR (95% CI) = 4.31 (0.83–22.5). Although the probability of detecting positive H1N1 (2009) positive aerosols when performing various AGPs on intensive care patients above the baseline rate (i.e. in the absence of AGPs) did not reach significance, there was a trend towards hierarchy of AGPs, placing bronchoscopy and respiratory and airway suctioning above baseline (background) values. Further, larger studies are required but these preliminary findings may be of benefit to infection control teams.
has issue date	2013-02-13(xsd:dateTime)
bibo:doi	10.1371/journal.pone.0056278
bibo:pmid	23418548
has license	cc-by
sha1sum (hex)	4f380911a4cf1b78dce1c016c1c0cc2f95a15f7b
schema:url	https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0056278
resource representing a document's title	Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) Pandemic – The Risk of Aerosol Generation during Medical Procedures
has PubMed Central identifier	PMC3571988
has PubMed identifier	23418548
schema:publication	PLoS One
resource representing a document's body	covid:4f380911a4cf1b78dce1c016c1c0cc2f95a15f7b#body_text
is schema:about of	named entity 'health-care' named entity 'Hospitals' named entity 'Generation' named entity 'DEFINED' named entity 'HEALTH' named entity 'RISK OF' named entity 'PROCEDURES' named entity 'RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS' named entity 'BACKGROUND' named entity 'IS A' named entity 'PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY' named entity 'THOUGHT' named entity 'DATA' named entity 'BUT' named entity 'QUANTIFY' named entity 'GENERATING' named entity 'H1N1' named entity 'CONCERN' named entity 'INFLUENZA A' named entity 'HOSPITALS' named entity 'AEROSOL' named entity 'INSUFFICIENT' named entity 'AEROSOL' named entity 'SIGNIFICANT' named entity 'RISK' named entity 'HIERARCHY' named entity 'TRANSMISSION' named entity 'AEROSOLS' named entity 'MEDICAL PROCEDURES' named entity 'H1N1' named entity 'PANDEMIC' named entity 'TO INCREASE' named entity 'CARE' named entity 'PRONE' named entity 'INFLUENZA' named entity 'PRESENTLY' named entity 'WORKERS' named entity 'MAKERS' named entity 'GENERATION' named entity 'RISK OF' named entity 'ESTABLISH' named entity 'NOSOCOMIAL INFECTION' named entity 'OUTBREAKS' named entity 'WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION' covid:arg/4f380911a4cf1b78dce1c016c1c0cc2f95a15f7b named entity '2009' named entity 'procedures' named entity 'respiratory infections' named entity 'Aerosols' named entity 'Medical' named entity 'WHO' named entity 'H1N1' named entity 'health-care' named entity 'aerosol' named entity 'Aerosols' named entity 'influenza' named entity 'infectious dose' named entity 'infection' named entity 'influenza' named entity '2.1' named entity 'viral RNA' named entity 'PCR primers' named entity 'respiring' named entity '95% CI' named entity 'binomial regression' named entity 'influenza' named entity 'infectious dose' named entity 'pathogen'

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